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Intra-processor Price-spread Behavior:
Is the U.S.  Catfish Processing Industry Competitive?
Darren Hudson
An analysis was conducted of price-spread behavior in the catfish-processing  sector of the United States. A
model of imperfect competition using conjectural  variations was used to test for significant deviations from
competition. Results show no significant deviation from competitive behavior, suggesting that catfish proc-
essors behave competitively. However, this result is limited by the assumption  of equal  market shares by
each catfish-processing firm.
The U.S.  Catfish Industry  catfish  production  can  still be  classified  as  a  com-
petitive  industry  (Dillard,  1995).  Dillard  states  that
Catfish  production  began  as  a  commercially  the  four-firm  industry  concentration  ratio  (Stigler,
viable enterprise  in  the  late  1960s  and early  1970s.  1988; Shughart, 1990) in catfish production has been
Production  of food-size  catfish has experienced  tre-  10 percent or less, further supporting the competitive
mendous growth  in recent times (13.84 percent from  market structure hypothesis.
1991  to  1997  (National  Agricultural  Statistics Serv-  Catfish  processing,  by  contrast,  is  substan-
ices,  various  issues))  while  the  number  of catfish  tially  more  concentrated.  The  four-firm  industry
producers  declined  29  percent  from  1989  to  1997.  concentration  ratio  was  98  percent  in  1979
However,  the  relatively  large  number  of producers  (Miller, 1981).  From 1980 to  1993,  the number of
that remain  (approximately  1,300),  freedom of entry  catfish  processors  increased  from  about  10  to
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Figure 1. Number of Catfish Processors Operating at the Begin-
ning of Each Year, 1981 through 1997.
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The four-firm  industry concentration  ratio in  genant  and Mullen's  test was  used  later  by Hud-
catfish  processing  had  decreased  to  an  estimated  son  (1998)  to  analyze  price-spread  behavior  in
60-70  percent  by  1995  (Dillard),  suggesting  a  catfish markets. This study analyzed price spreads
modest  shift  in  industry  structure.  This  change  at two different  levels of the market channel.  The
may  have  implications  for price  behavior  in  cat-  first  price  spread  was  between  the  farm  and  the
fish markets.  first  stage  of processing  while  the  second  was
Industry  concentration  prior  to  1979  was  between  levels  of processing.  Findings  from  this
such  that  it  suggested  an  oligopolistic  market  study indicated that the performance  of a mark-up
structure,  implying  Cournot,  conjectural  varia-  pricing  model  was  superior  by  empirical  stan-
tions,  or some other oligopoly-type  firm behavior.  dards  in  explaining  farm/processor  and  intra-
The  decrease  in  concentration  (increase  in  the  processor  spreads in catfish markets.  However, as
number  of  processors)  may  have  led  to  more  the  number  of  processors  increased,  margins
"competitive"  market  behavior.  The  objective  of  tended to decrease.
this  paper  is  to  examine  the  potential  impact  of  The hypothesis  offered  as  an explanation  for
the  increasing  number  of  catfish  processors  on  this result  was  that  the  level  of competition  may
price-spread  behavior in catfish markets.  The pre-  have been increasing over time. The overall  result
sent analysis  is a departure  from the "traditional"  of that study would suggest that the catfish market
farm-retail  price-spread  analyses  in that  the  sub-  is  not  competitive.  However,  this  is  not  direct
ject  of this  analysis  is  the  price  spread  between  evidence  of market structure  or performance.  The
levels  of  processing  or  "intra-processor."  The  ambiguity  of the  result  in  Hudson  (1998),  with
point  of  contention  is  whether  changes  in  the  respect to market  structure and  performance,  sug-
number of processors  have  affected  price spreads  gests  a need to view price-spread behavior from a
between  the final  stage  of processing  and  prices  more  appropriate  empirical  perspective.  The
of fish at the beginning of processing.  method  provided  by  Wohlgenant  and  Mullen
(1987)  is  adequate  for competitive  industries  but
Related Literature  does  not  allow  a  direct  test  of market  behavior
(Holloway,  1991).  Some  imperfectly  competitive
A  broad  range  of literature  exists  on  price-  market models are fruitful  in that regard.
spread  behavior  in  competitive  markets.  Literature  on  imperfectly  competitive  mar-
Gardner's  seminal  work  in  this  area  formalized  kets  is somewhat  less abundant but still prevalent.
the theory  of price-spread behavior in  a  compara-  Schroeter  and  Azzam  (1991)  analyzed  the
tive statics framework.  His findings  suggest that a  farm/wholesale  margin  in  the  pork  industry,  ac-
simple  mark-up  pricing  rule  does  not  describe  counting for the factors  of market power and risk.
price-spread  behavior  in  a  competitive  food  sys-  Using  conjectural  variations,  these  authors  found
tem.  The  significance  of this  work is  recognizing  that  competitive  performance  in  the  market  was
the  role  of marketing  volume  on  the  farm-retail  maintained  despite  the  dramatic  increase  in
price  spreads  in  competitive  markets.  As  the  packer  concentration.  Conjectural  variation  was
quantity of a product  moving  through  the market  also employed by Sexton  (1990) in his analysis  of
channel  increases,  demand  for  marketing  inputs  the  role  of  cooperatives  in  agricultural  markets.
increases.  This,  in  turn,  affects  the  price  margin  As  a  departure  from  the  conjectural  variations
between market levels.  model,  a dominant  firm/competitive  fringe model
Wohlgenant  and  Mullen  (1987)  further built  was employed by Buschena  and Perloff (1991)  in
upon  this  foundation  by developing  a test  to  de-  their analysis  of market power in the  coconut  oil
termine  if  Gardner's  relative  price  model  or  a  export  market.  This  area  of  literature  demon-
mark-up  model  best  empirically  described  the  strates  the  applicability  of imperfectly  competi-
farm-retail  price  spread  in  beef.  Using  a  non-  tive models to various food industries.
nested  technique,  these  authors  found  that  the  One  paper  by  Kouka  (1995)  is  particularly
relative  price  model  best  empirically  explained  relevant  to  this  analysis  in  that  he  estimated  the
price  spreads  in  the beef  industry,  which  is  con-  value  of the  conjectural  elasticity  and  oligopoly
sistent  with  the  supposition  of  Gardner.  Wohl-  power index for the catfish industry. Using annualHudson, Darren  Intra-processor  Price-spread  Behavior  61
aggregate  data,  he  found  evidence  to  support  a  The marginal cost function, C,  is defined over the
conclusion  of oligopoly  structure  in  catfish proc-  price vector (Pa,  Pb)  and corresponds  to a linearly
essing.  However,  the approach  offered  by Kouka  homogeneous  technology  in  two  variable  inputs
does  not lead to  a testable  hypothesis  for market  (ai,  bi).  The  two  variable  inputs  are  the  firm's
structure.  His conclusions  do  suggest  a  potential  quantity of fresh whole  catfish  (farm commodity)
change  in  market behavior  through time,  a result  and  labor  (a  marketing  service  input),  respec-
also pointed to by Hudson (1998).  tively.  All firms have the variables  PQFL,  Ir,  and C
Holloway  formalized  the  concept  of  farm-  in  common,  implying  that  8i  =  0j  =  0  {i  *  j}.
retail  price  spreads  in  imperfectly  competitive  Holloway also assumes that QFLi = QFLj = QFLn
markets  by  examining  the  role  of  conjectural  =  QFL/n,  or  that  each  firm  produces  the  same
elasticities  inside  Gardner's  (1975)  framework.  level  of output.'  This  simplifying  assumption  of
The  author develops  the  necessary  and  sufficient  symmetric  equilibrium  is  made  for  analytical
conditions  for perfect competition  in the  food in-  clarity.
dustry.  Through  this  formulation,  Holloway  Equation  (2)  provides  useful  results  for the
(1991)  further  develops  an  empirical  framework  current analysis.  In  one  extreme,  Ei =  1 indicates
by  which  to  test  the  hypothesis  of competition  cartel  or monopoly  behavior.  By contrast,  6i  = 0
(specifically,  competitive  behavior)  in  food  mar-  indicates  perfect  competition.  Thus,  it  would  be
kets. Access  to this  procedure  affords  the  ability  appealing  to  test for  06;  0,  an  indication  of im-
to test the competitiveness of catfish processors.  perfect competition.  A  good  deal  of Holloway's
(1991)  comments  (pp.  982-986)  are  devoted  to
Analytical Model  deriving an approach for this test.
One interesting result from this  derivation  is
One  appealing  feature  of Holloway's  (1991)  the  similarity  of Holloway's  results  to  Gardner's model,  in  terms  of the  present  study,  is  the  en-  T  ,  , co
dogeneity  of the number of processors; Holloway  "  -,...  ",  . '  . - shares  reduce to revenue  shares,  forcing the firm-
makes  explicit  the  entry  and  exit  of processing  ..  r  . i  .t.  ,  entry condition moot. Thus, when  80  = 0, firm en-
firms  into  market behavior  analysis.  This  is  rele-  . . T  w  - try is not a factor in farm-retail price spreads,  im-
vant  to the  current  study because  of the  large  in-  p  r  plying competitive  markets. This further suggests crease  in  the  number  of  processors  in  catfish  . T  i  u  t
that  firm  entry,  as  is  important  in  the  current processing  during  the past two  decades.  The  fol- study, can have an impact  on price-spread  behav-
lowing  discussion  draws  heavily  on  the  deriva-  . . c. 
ior  in  less  than  perfectly  competitive  industries.
tions in Holloway,  but only necessary  portions  of 
his  approach  are  reproduced  here.  - Also important  to this analysis,  as the  number  of his approach  are reproduced here. firms  increases,  price  behavior  more  closely  ap- Given  an  industry  demand  function,  each  . Givn  a  id.  dproximates the  competitive  situation  (that is,  0i =
firm i forms  its  conjecture  about  the relationship  compet  . i  n 
0) for Cournot competitors. Given that  0,  = 0 gen- of  its  own  output  to  industry  output,  QFL=
oits  own  u  to  instry  ouantpt  ofils  erates  a result consistent with  the competitive  so- Ki(QFLi)  (where  QFL  is  the  quantity  of  fillets
JQ  (wh  L  is  te  q  tityof  f  s  lution,  the question  becomes:  Is  09  >  0  so  that  it produced).  According  to  Applebaum  (1982),  the  q
of industry  outt cd  fim  can  be said to be statistically different from zero? elasticity of industry  output conjectured by firm i,
e~lisasticity  as  This question is addressed  in the Methods section. 0i, is given as Some attention  should be given  to the neces-
(1)  i  = AK j/IQFL; (QFL1/QFL).  sary  and  sufficient conditions  for perfect  compe-
tition in food markets.  Based on  Holloway  (1991,
see  pp.  984-985  for a more  detailed  discussion), If C is defined as the firm's marginal cost and  Tl  is  s  . 9
the market  price  el  y  of demad  cafish  there are three necessary  and sufficient conditions the  market price  elasticity  of demand  for catfish
e m  pri  e  o d  ca  s  for perfect  competition. The  first condition  is that fillets,  each firm's first-order  condition  for profit  c
.. maximization  is  given by  the  elasticity  of  changes  in  the  price  of  fresh maximization is given by
whole catfish-with respect to changes in demand
(2)  PQ(1 +0i/*)  = C.
The  potential  implications  of this  assumption  are explored
later in the paper.62  Jul)y 1998  Journal  of Food Distribution  Research
for catfish fillets-must equal  the negative of the  sion  from  the  instantaneous  relative  changes  in
elasticity  of changes  in  the  price  of fresh  whole  the variables (R* = AR/R)  as per Wohlgenant.
catfish-with respect to  changes  in the  supply  of  The  price  spread  formulated  here  is  not  a
fresh  whole  catfish.  This  is  analogous  to  saying  true  farm/processor  spread  in  the  sense  that  the
that QTr= 0, which implies that either e = 0,  1 = 0,  input  price  used  here  is  for fish  that  has  under-
or  both.  Even  in  the  case  of  perfectly  inelastic  gone  the initial  stages of processing  (that  is, has
demand,  Holloway  shows  that  e  =  0,  implying  been  skinned  and  gutted).  An  important  note
about  the  selection  of  this  variable  should  be
that the above restriction  is a sufficient  condition
thatr  competithebov.  made.  Catfish  meant  for  fillets  bypass  this  first
for competition.,  c  i  s  l  o  r  s  stage  of processing  (dressing)  and  move  straight
The second  condition, similar to the first, is  c  F  fish  are '  the.  e y o'  into  filleting  machines.  Fresh  dressed  fish  are
that the elasticity  of changes  in  te  the  pce of cat-  ypically  bound  for  consumption  rather  than  for
fish  fillets-with  respect  to  changes  in  the  de-  further  processing.  One  potential  limitation  of
mand for catfish fillets-must equal the negative  using this  series  is that the  price of fresh  dressed
of the elasticity of changes  in the price of catfish  fish could  be  subject  to  slightly different  market
fillets-with respect to changes  in the supply  of  forces than fillet prices could. However,  the price
fresh  whole  catfish.  This  is  sufficient  to  show  for  fresh  dressed  fish  does  represent  what  the
that  (0/(0  +  rl))WbO  =  0,  where  Wb  is  the  cost  value  of the  fish  is,  net  by-products;  thus,  it  is
share for the non-farm  input and is the elasticity  used as  a proxy for the price of the raw input into
of substitution between  catfish  and  the market-  fillet processing.
ing  (non-farm)  input.  Because  wb  >  0  by  as-  The  second price (the price  of fillets)  repre-
sumption,  this  condition  implies  that either  e  =  sents what the processor received for the finished
0, o = 0, or both, suggesting  the need to test  Ho:  product.  This margin can  be more accurately  de-
o  =  0 as  well  as  Ho:  e  =  0  in  an  equation  in-  scribed  as  the  within  or  "intra-processor"  price
volving  the price  of catfish fillets. The  possibil-  spread.  The  limitation  of this approach  is  that  it
ity of o * 0 implies  the need for another  restric-  does  not  test  the  market  behavior  of  the  entire
tion.  According  to  Holloway,  this  restriction  is  catfish industry. It does,  however,  test the behav-
imposed  when  the  elasticity  of  changes  in  the  ior of the processing subsector, which is the focus
price  of catfish fillets-with  respect  to changes  of this study.
in  the  price  of the  marketing  input  (labor)-is  To test for the potential  of competitive  mar-
forced to be equal  to zero.  ket behavior, equations  (3)  through  (5)  were  first
estimated  without  the  necessary  conditions  im-
Methods  posed. The  second step in this  analysis  is  to esti-
mate  equations  (3)  through  (5),  imposing  the  re-
The above  restrictions  were  tested  using  the  strictions on price elasticities (not on the elasticity
following three equations of the catfish market:  of substitution).  That  is,  in the  second  step,  a;  =
-a2,  P1  =  -P2,  and  01  =  -02 restrictions  were  im-
(3)  R7 = aQFL + aQF, + a 3PLt +£R,t,  posed  on  equations  (3)  through  (5),  respectively.
Under Ho:  0 = 0, the F-values resulting from these
(4)  PQp,I  = P]QFL,  + P2QFt  +  3 PP,t + EPqfl,,  restrictions  will not be significantly  different from
one at the 5 percent level of significance.
(5)  PQF,  = qIQFLI +  2QFi  + 03PL,t + EPqf,t'  Two empirical  points should  be noted.  First,
there  is  reason  to  believe  that  the  disturbance
where R is the ratio of the processor price of cat-  terms  for equations  (3)  through  (5)  will  be  con-
fish  fillets  (PQFL)  to  the processor  price for fresh  temporaneously  correlated.  However,  because
dressed catfish  (PQF),  QFL is the quantity of fillets  there  are  no  cross-equation  restrictions,  and  the
sold  by  processors,  QF  is  the  quantity  of fresh  same  independent  variables  appear  on  the  right-
whole fish processed by catfish processors,  and Ej  hand  side  of  the  equations,  the  ordinary  least
is  the  disturbance  term  for  each  equation.  The  squares regression  (OLS)  is  still applicable  (Hol-
asterisks denote  the transformation  of those vari-  loway,  1991).  Second,  deflating  the  price  series
ables  into  the  first  difference  in  logarithms  (for  imposes  a  zero  homogeneity  restriction,  which
example, Rt'  = ln(Rt)  - ln(Rt. 1)). This  is a conver-  yields efficient  estimates under the assumption ofHudson, Darren  Intra-processor  Price-spread  Behavior  63
perfect  competition  but  limits  inferences  about  changes  in  the  demand  for  catfish  fillets,  was
market  behavior.  Thus,  equations  (3)  through  (5)  expected  to  be  negative;  however,  this  variable
were estimated with prices in nominal form.  is not statistically significant.  The implication  of
The final step in this analysis  was to test Ho: a  this equation  is that only  changes  in  wage rates
= 0, or the elasticity of substitution between inputs  (a  proxy for changes  in  marketing  input  prices)
is equal  to zero.  This  is  only relevant  to the  retail  affect changes  in the fillet/fresh  fish price  ratio.
price  equation (4).  The restriction  is accomplished  This  result  is  consistent  with  the  finding  by
by jointly estimating  the effects  of the  restrictions  (Hudson,  1998) in  that the volume marketed  had
P1  = -P2 and  33 = 0. If P1  = -P2 yields the result that  no effect on the price ratio. What may have  gen-
0  = 0 and if a *  0, the market is concluded  to ex-  erated  this ambiguous  result is the fact that both
hibit a competitive market structure.  farm  output  and  finished  product  demand  were
Data  for  this  analysis  were  monthly  price  expanding  rapidly  over the period of analysis  so
and  quantity  data  for catfish  (National  Agricul-  that the effects of volume on the price  ratio were
tural  Statistics  Service,  various  issues)  and  masked.  This  issue  is  discussed  in  more  detail
monthly  average  wage  rates  in  food  processing  below. Both  price equations,  however, exhibited
industries (Bureau  of Labor Statistics,  1998)  for  results  consistent  with  prior  theoretical  devel-
the period  1986 through  1993.  That  time  period  opment.
was  selected  for  two  reasons.  First,  the  period  Table  2  shows  the results  of the  restricted
exhibited  the  most  growth  in  the  number  of  regressions.  For  the  fillet/fresh  fish  ratio,  the
processors  (Figure  1).  Thus,  changes  in  market  restriction of ca  = -a 2 is marginally  restrictive at
behavior would be expected  to be most prevalent  the 5 percent level of significance (that is,  e0  0)
over  that  time  period.  Second,  a  reliable,  con-  (in  fact, the p-value  on  the F-test  was  0.05039).
sistent  set  of data  was  readily  available  during  This  would  suggest  that  the  catfish-processing
that time period.  subsector  is  imperfectly  competitive.  However,
the results for the two price equations  suggest an
Results  opposite  conclusion  (that  is,  0  *  0).  The  mar-
ginal significance of the result for the price ratio
The  results  of  the  unrestricted  regression  equation  and  the  failure  to  reject  0  =  0  in  the
are  shown  in Table  1. Each  of these regressions  price equations suggests that perfect competition
showed  signs  of  first-order  autocorrelation,  so  is  the  conclusion  to  be  drawn  for  the  catfish
the parameters  were  adjusted  using a Cochrane-  processing  subsector.  The  sufficiency  of  these
Orcutt transformation, resulting in  the parameter  estimated results for a conclusion  of competition
(elasticity)  estimates found  in Table  1. The  signs  is  further  tested  using  the  fillet  price  equation
on the estimates  are  consistent with  a priori ex-  (4)  and  restricting  33  =  0.  These  results  are
pectations,  with  the  exception  of  the  equation  shown  in  Table  3  and  provide  strong  evidence
for the  fillet/fresh  fish  price  ratio.  The  sign  on  that a  t 0,  further  supporting  the conclusion  of
the  elasticity  of  this  ratio,  with  respect  to  competitive behavior.
Table 1. Results of the Unrestricted Regression.
Estimated  Elasticities with Respect to:
Price  Fillets Sold  Fresh Whole Fish  Wages
Ratio  0.016703  0.017209  .51193
(0.4487)a  (0.3881)  (6.339)
R2 = .973
Fillets  0.05805  -0.066319  0.5359
(2.547)  (-2.44)  (10.81)
R  = .981
Fresh Fish  0.12213  -0.13954  0.35064
(2.784)  (-2.707)  (3.805)
R2 = .7664
a The numbers  in parentheses are t-values; degrees of freedom = 89 for each equation.64  July 1998  Journal of Food Distribution  Research
Table 2. Results  of Restricted Regression.
Estimated Elasticity with Respect  to:
Price  F-valuea  Fillets Sold  Fresh Whole Fish  Wages
Ratio  3.9356  -0.040356  0.040356  0.60127
(-0.8456)"  (0.08456)  (18.36)
R2 = .9687
Fillet  1.0327  0.074163  -0.074163  0.51080
(2.535)  (-2.535)  (25.44)
R2=.9783
Fresh Fish  0.81034  0.1513  -0.1513  0.30177
(3.009)  (-3.009)  (8.742)
R2 = .7542
F-value for Ho: e = 0.
b  The numbers in parentheses  are t-values; degrees  of freedom = 89 for each equation.
Table 3. Results  of Additional Restricted Regression for the Test of a = 0.
Estimated Elasticity with Respect to:
Price  F-value a Fillets Sold  Fresh Fish  Wages
Fillet  324.26  -0.61994  0.61994  0
(-20.55)"  (20.55)
R2 = .8225
a F-value for the test of a = 0.
b  The numbers in parentheses  are t-values; degrees  of freedom = 90.
The ambiguous result with respect to the price  fectly  competitive  models  are  known  to  generate
ratio  equation  is somewhat  puzzling  when  viewed  behavior  consistent  with  competition  but  are not
in conjunction with the other results. One plausible  "competitive"  in  structure.  The  result  of  a  con-
explanation  for this result,  alluded to earlier, is the  testable  market  is  the  situation  where  P = MC  =
rapid expansion  of farm  output  of catfish  and  the  AC or no long-run  profits are possible. Thus,  it is
corresponding  expansion  in demand  for catfish.  It  possible to  observe  competitive behavior  without
has  been  shown  that  farm  price  can,  in  fact,  in-  competitive  structure.  This  may  be  the  case  in
crease  with  an  outward  shift in farm output  (Chen  catfish processing.  That is, Dillard found the four-
and  Lent,  1992).  Specifically,  this  result  is  more  firm industry concentration  ratio to  be in the  60-
likely  to  because  of the  fact  that  the  increases  in  70 percent  range but also  found  that no  long-run
farm  output are  likely  to  stimulate entry  into  food  profits  have  been  observed  in  the  industry.  This
processing  (Hamilton  and  Sunding,  1997).  Thus,  issue deserves further attention  in both theoretical
expanding  farm  output  may  serve  to  "mask"  the  and empirical  studies of performance.
effects  on  the  price  ratio  between  market  levels  Another  interesting  note  is  that  these  find-
when viewed in light of these findings.  ings  are obvious contradictions to those of Kouka
Another  factor  that  does  not  appear  to  be  (1995).  However,  Kouka  was  using  annual  data
directly  addressed  by  either  Holloway  (1991)  or  over  a  longer time  period  (1977  through  1993).
the  present  model  is  the  potential  for  "competi-  This study  confined  the period  of analysis to the
tion-mimicking"  market structures. Market struc  1986  through  1993 period but used monthly  data.
tures,  such  as contestable  markets  (Baumol,  Pan-  Confining  the  sample  to  the  period  of  rapid
zer, and Willig,  1982), or other zero-profit imper-  growth  in  the  number  of  processors  may  haveHudson, Darren  Intra-processor  Price-spread  Behavior  65
served to  "bring out"  the  effects  of firm entry as  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics.  1998.  "Average  Hourly  Earn-
compared  to  the  longer  time  periods  used  by  ings  of  Production  Workers  in  Food  and  Kindred
Products  Industries."  In  National  Employment,
Kouka.  This  may  be  especially  true  given  that  Hours,  and  Earnings, BLS  web  page,  http:1146.
much  of the  time  period  in  Kouka's  analysis  is  142.4.24/.
characterized by "extreme" industry concentration  Buschena,  D.,  and  J.  Perloff.  1991.  "The  Creation  of
(Dillard, 1995; Miller,  1981).  Dominant  Firm  Market  Power  in  the  Coconut  Oil
Export  Market."  American  Journal of Agricultural
Conclusions  and Caveats  Economics. 73:1000-1008.
Chen,  Z.,  and  R.  Lent.  1992.  "Supply  Analysis  in  an  Oli-
gopsony  Model."  American Journal of Agricultural
The  relative  newness  of the catfish  industry  Economics. 74:583-591.
has, to this point,  precluded  any  extensive  analy-  Dillard,  J. 1995.  "Organization  of  the  Catfish  Industry:  A
ses  of the  performance  of the  catfish  marketing  Comment  on  Market  Structure-Conduct-
system.  This  analysis  marks  a major  step  in  un-  Performance."  Paper  presented  to  the  Annual  Meet-
ing of the Catfish Farmers  of America, Memphis, TN. derstanding the  behavior  of catfish processors.  It  .^ derstanding  the  behavior of catfsh processors.  It  Gardner,  B.  1975.  "The  Farm-Retail  Price  Spread  in  a
is reasonably clear  from this analysis  that behav-  Competitive  Food  Industry."  American  Journal of
ior in the catfish processing subsector has not de-  Agricultural  Economics. 57:399-409.
viated  significantly  from  competitive  behavior  Hamilton,  S.,  and D.  Sunding.  1997.  "The Effect  of Farm
over  the  period  studied.  However,  it  also  seems  Supply Shifts on Concentration  and Market  Power in the  Food  Processing  Sector."  American  Journal of
clear  that the issue  of structure  is  somewhat am-  Agricultural  Economics. 79:524-531.
biguous.  Prima facie  evidence  would suggest that  Holloway,  G.  1991.  "The Farm-Retail  Price  Spread  in  an
the structure cannot  be classified  as competitive.  Imperfectly  Competitive  Food  Industry."  American
Rather,  other  structures  such  as contestable  mar-  Journal  ofAgricultural  Economics. 73:979-989.
e  . ,  Hudson,  D.  1998.  "An Examination  of Farm/Processor and
kets may be more rereesentative.  Nonetheless,  no  Intra-Processor  Price  Spreads  in  Catfish  Markets."
direct evidence  in that regard is offered here.  Mississippi  Agricultural  and  Forestry  Experiment
An important  limitation  to this  study  should  Station Paper No. J-9330.
be mentioned.  Holloway's  (1991)  model assumes  Kouka,  P.  1995.  "An  Empirical  Model  of Pricing  in  the
Catfish  Industry."  Marine  Resource  Economics. that each  firm's output is equal,  generating  equal  10.161-169 10:161-169.,
conjectural  elasticities.  The assumption  that  total  Miller,  J.  1981.  "The  Structural  and  Operational  Charac-
output  is  divided  equally  among  firms  automati-  teristics  and  the  Procurement  and  Marketing  Prac-
cally forces  the condition of equal market  power.  tices  of the  U.S.  Catfish  for Food  Processing  Indus-
This  necessarily  limits  inferences  that  can  be  try."  Unpublished  Master's  Thesis,  Mississippi  State
University, Mississippi State, MS. made  about the conjectural  elasticity to  situations  University, Mississippi  State, MS. made  about  the  conjectural  elasticity to situations  National  Agricultural  Statistics  Service.  Various  issues.
that closely  resemble  this  assumption.  Holloway  "Catfish Processing."  Washington, DC.
states  that  this limitation  becomes  less  important  Schroeter,  J.,  and  A.  Azzam.  1991.  "Marketing  Margins,
as  the  number  of firms  increase,  but  that  is  as-  Market  Power,  and  Price  Uncertainty."  American
that  output  is relatively  evenly  distributed.  Journal  of Agricultural  Economics. 73:990-999.
suming that output IS relatively  evenly  distnibuted.  Sexton,  R.  1990.  "Imperfect  Competition  in  Agricultural
This  assumption  makes  the  model  analytically  Markets  and  the  Role  of  Cooperatives:  A  Spatial
appealing  but may  serve  to be too restrictive  em-  Analysis."  American  Journal of Agricultural Eco-
pirically.  Because  of analytical  intractability,  re-  nomics. 72:709-720.
laxing  this assumption  may  involve more  empiri-  Shughart,  W.,  . 1990.  The  Organization of  ndust Homewood,  IL: Richard D.  Irwin, Inc.
cal exploration.  Stigler,  G.  1988.  The  Organization  of  Industry.
Homewood,  IL: Richard D.  Irwin, Inc.
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